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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JESS BEl. . TLER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
l'S.

Case No.
7438

DE"\V.AIN BERGER,
Defendent and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

ST.A_TE~fENT

OF FACTS
:i\'[uch of the Statement of Facts by appellant contains the testin1ony n1ost favorable to the defendant,
but ~ince the facts in the case are not long nor complicated \ve refrain fro1n repeating the statement of
facts stated but content ourselves "\vith briefly adding
the follo,ving facts:
Even though the plaintiff accepted the word of the
defendant at the time and place of the shooting that
the shooting \\~as to scare the horses and did not at that
ti1ne aeense defendant of shooting the animal the next
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1norn1ng, ''Thieh \\'as the next n1eeting of the parties,
he did pro1uptly accuse the defendant of shooting the
animal and at that time the defendant told the plaintiff
in substance "that he could shoot anything on his
property as long as he left it lay." They had an arguInent about that. (Tr 58)
The plaintiff could not get the colt at first so
took the other animals home and retuned at once for
this colt. The colt was now down and laid down twice
while he was taking it home, and he thought it had
a bad case of colic (Tr. 56) but later in the morning
on examination he discovered the bullet hole above
the flank. (Tr 57) On cross examination the plaintiff
testified in answer to questions by appellant's counsel
that he could tell the bullet had gone ''right in through
the intestines. I arrived at the conclusion he had shot
the animal. I heard the shot and there was no other
conclusion to arrive at \Vhen there was bullet hole
through her. ' ' ( Tr 67)
rr"he plaintiff testified that it 'vas l110re than t'vo
rnonths after the shooting before anything was said
about gun balistics and that in the meantime there
'vere lots of places to put the gun that had been used.
(Tr 69)

ARGUMENT
Respondent will take up ·appellant's points In the
same order they are presented in his brief.
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3
..\~signntents 1 and 2. Plaintiff's evidence a8 to
reputation.
The appellant assigns as error the Trial Court's
per1nitting the plaintiff, in rebuttal, to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's reputation in the con1munity
for keeping his ani1nals penned up in the yard in the
usual 1nanner. This evidence \vent to the question of
nn1nber of tilnes the plaintiff's anin1als had trespassed
upon defendant's premises and consequently the amount
of dan1ages to 'vhieh defendant 'vas entitled on the
counterclain1. The jury fixed his dan1ages at $25.00. In
his notice of appeal he did not purport to appeal from
the verdict in his favor on· the counterclaim. Under
these circu1nstances the assignment cannot be prejudicial on this appeal.
Briefly on the n1erits of the ruling, however, it
~hould be said that there 'vas evidence that plaintiff's
fences 'vere in order and the fresh sno"\v was so deep
that the animals escaped over the fence Tr 61). Defendant offered son1e evidence the animals trespassed
on his pre1nises on a number of occasions. This evidence
'vas disputed by other 'vitnesses (Tr 98, 120, 121, 125).
rrhe evidence was n1aterial on the matter of the amount
of damages caused by the anin1als. Counsel's authority
in 22 C. J. go to the question of defendants character
in cri1ninal cases and has no bearing here.
The question of a1nount of dan1ages 'vas for the
jnr:'" and it 'vas therefore proper rebuttal after de-
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fendant 's rross exan1ination of plaintiff on the subject
(Tr 61) to sho\v plaintiff's reputation in the community
as ·to such conduct, such evidence being relevant to
the issue of amount of damages.

3 to 10. Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Verdict
and Judgment.
The appellant addresses the same arguments to
this Court about the evidence that he did to the jury;
viz, the plaintiff only heard the defendant shoot once.
The animal had been struck by two bullets. Under the
rule that evidence should be reconciled if possible it
was the duty of the jury to reconcile the evidence by
finding the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendant
shot the bullet that killed the animal. It is contended that
all of this argun1ent rnerely goes to the weight of the
evidence. The vveight of the eviQ.ence is for the jury and
the rule is so \vell established that no exhaustive list
of cases are here cited, that this court on appeal will
not exa1nine into the weight of the evidence but will
only inquire as to whether or not there is any substantial
t:~vidence to support the verdict. From State Bank of
Beaver vs IIollingshead 82 Ut. 416, 25 Pac 2nd 612 we
qnote the following:
"It is no consequence \Vhat our opinion may
be as to the facts. If there is substantial evidenee
to sustain the verdict~ this court is powerless to
set it aside. (Citing previous Utah cases) ~fany
cases to this effect have been decided hy this
court.''
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The evidence and circu1nstances here not only support the verdict but the verdict is the only logical
rpsnlt fron1 the evidence.

r:I~he

anin1al \vas in good health

the night before. It "Tas early in the 1norning in a rural
eonnnunity. Plaintiff happened along just at the time
defendant shot. The bullet "Tas a 22 bullet. The animal
had not yet gone do"\\rn \Yhen plaintiff rode out to the
horses but it did not 1nove and plaintiff took his other
ani1nals ho1ne. \\'.hen he can1e back in a few minutes
the ani1nal "Tas do\vn. It \vent down t'vo or three times
on his "Tay ho1ne ( 300 yards) ; it acted like a bad case
of colic. He exan1ined and found the bullet hole. He
called the veterinarian. There vvas nothing he could
do and he expected the animal to die that day. It did
die that night. The veterinarian's testimony that the
anin1al died as a result of the gun shot wound is not
disputed. It is difficult to imagine a more complete case.
The fact that the defendant offered evidence that there
\Vas other shooting in the neighborhood (not the same
1norning) and the horse also carried another flesh wound
1night he so1ne ground for argu1nent that the death
1night have resulted from a bullet fired by someone
else, but jf this could be dignified to be called a dispute
in the evidence it went only to its weight. The jury
rightly concluded that the testimony could not be
har1nonized in defendant's ·favor.
The malpractice case of Edwards vs Clark 83 Pac
2nd 1021 is not in point in any way and we have no
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quarrel \vith the rule that a verdict must have more
to support it than a possibility that it might have happened in that manner. Neither does the rule in 32 C.J.S.
at 1133 that evidence is inconsistent with direct, positive
and other,vise· uncontradicted testimony that a fact does
not exist \Yill not support an inference that it does, have
ah~y application to the facts in this case. The rule is
that facts need not in every case be established by exact
scientific uncontradicted evidence. It is enough that
sufficient evidence of a fact be offered to convince a
reasonable person of the existence of the fact.
Balistics. Counsel on cross exa1nination elicited
fron1 the plaintiff that about t\vo and one-half months
after the shooting defendant suggested that they have a
halistics test of the gun and bullet found in the horse
as a Ineans of settling the case. Plaintiff declined to
take the bait saying that it \vould be an easy matter
to bring in some other gun. In fact, it would seem very
logical for the defendant to do that very thing before
making such an offer. He could have resorted to a
balistics examination of the bullet and his gun if he
cared to do so~ Counsel argued this rna tter very fully
to the j-ury. The jury did not appear to be impressed.
It was a question of weight of the evidence for the
jury \Vas settled by the verdict. Certainly, there is nothing in this circumstance to require this court to hold
as a matter of la\v that the defendant would have
snb1nitted the san1e gun \vith which he admittedly fire<J.
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tht\

~hot

on that n1orn1ng.

Instrurtion No. 4. Plaintiff assigns as error the givIng of Instruction No. 4 to the effect that defendant
had no right to kill a trespassing animal. Apparantly
it i~ eonreded that the instruction contains a correct
state1nent of the la,,-, 3 C.J. 2nd 1328 Section 213 .
. .\ppellant objects to the instruction for the reason
''The jury ,,-as told by the court, in effect, in this instruction, that the defendant claimed the. right to kill
the aniinal if it was trespassing when no such claim
'vas 1nade either in the pleadings or in the evidence.'' ,
The instruction. says nothing about defendant's claiming a right to kill the animal. The evidence does howeYer sho\Y that at the time the plaintiff accused the
defendant of shooting the animal, defendant said in
substance that he ''had a right to shoot anything on
his place as long as he left it lay there." (Tr 58) An
exa1nination of the entire record also sho,vs that the
subject \vas brought up by the court in his examination
of the jury and this instruction was not given for the
purpose of. inferring claims by either people but of
narro,ving the issues to be decided by the jury and inforining them that there was no issue in the case of a
right to kill the _animal. If there was any error it was
clearly har1nless. Considered as an instruction limiting
the issues it was just as much in defendant's favor
as in favor of the plaintiff. The error was also harmless
hPJ'<• hecanse the jur~- rendered no general verdict.
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Appellant also asserts that it is reversible error
for the Court to instruct on plaintiff's theory of the
case and to ignore the defendant's theory. The case was
subrnitted to the jury upon special interrogatories,
which in no way favored either theory of the case,
but left the findings of fact, based on the evidence,
up to the jury. On such interrogatories, the jury found
that the defendant did shoot the plaintiff's horse, thereby causing its death, which finding was in plaintiff's
favor and which accepted his theory of the case. As
to the Court's instructions which accompanied the
special interrogatories, they were in part based on requested instructions submitted by the plaintiff. Defendant, on the other hand, failed to submit any requests
for instructions, and the rule is well settled that error
cannot be based on failure to give particular instructions
'vhen no request therefor is made. Taylor vs. Los
1\.ngeles & S.L. Ry. Co., 61 Utah 524, 216 Pac. 239;
Salt Lake & U. Ry Co. vs Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189
Pac. 90. The authority cited by appellant supports this
rule of law in the following language, found in Nash
vs Myers, 54 Ida. 283, 31 P. ( 2d) 273, at page 181:
(Cited by appellant at p. 19 _of Appellant's Brief.)
"***the Court should instruct on appellant's
as well as respondents' theories of the case
where appropriate instructions are presented.''
(Italics supplied)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
.A.ssigninent of Error 11
Appellant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to grant a ne"\Y trial on defendant's motion which
"-as based upon an affidavit by the defendant, Dewain
Berger, as to certain alleged mis-conduct of one of the
jurors, Gny E. ~Ierrill. The affidavit of the defendant
filed in support of the n1otion for a new trial comes
squarely "-ith the case of Glazier vs. Cram, 71 Utah
+G3, 26·7 Pac. 188. The defendant's affidavit is apparently based on hearsay, or at best, upon information
and belief. This Court, in the Glazier case made the
following statement:
".}Iuch of the 1natter stated in the affidavits
is alleged on inforn1ation and belief. As to such
n1atter the brief of counsel for defendant calls
our attention to the follo,ving language in Hayne
on N e\\- Trial (Rev. Ed.) p. 240:
~ ' . A_ffidavits based upon information and beief are 'vholly valueless for the purp.ose of establishing the facts upon which an irregularity
of this description'
'' 'l,he affidavits of jurors are inadmissable
to in1peach their verdict, except where it was
arrived at by resort to chance.''
The defendant's affidavit does not purport to set
forth when or where or to whom or under what circumstances the Juror !ferrill made the alleged statement, and even if he had made the statement and it
had been true it would not have been grounds for
ehallenge of the juror for cause.
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The Court then cites considerable authority In
support of this rule.
The affidavit relied upon by appellant, aside from
the defects above noted, is not in and o~ itself sufficient
grounds for the granting of a new trial. The affidavit
states··· that one of the jurymen called upon his own
knowledge and experience in considering the case. This
is a necessary function of all juries, and each and every
juryman 1nust depend on his knowledge and experience in weighing evidence. The rule as stated in the
authority cited by the defendant and appellant at page
20 of his Brief, 39, Am. Jur. page 96, section 83, is as
follo"rs: That a juror is not precluded ''from ·-applying
his o"'n general knowledge and experience to the exainination of the case In estimating the weight of the
evidence.''
The appellant further alleges that the said juror
acted to appellant's prejudice in failing to answer
truthfully the Court's questions to the jury. An examination of the questions asked by the Court, as set
out on pages 20 and 21 of appellant's Brief, and compared with the contents of the affidavit, will show that
the ·juror in no way made a false ans,ver. The Court's
questions had to do with experience with taking an·
imals to the pound and with trespassing animals eating
hay. There were no questions about any of the jurY1Jlen
having experience with ''this kind of a situation as the
shooting of horse" as alleged in appellant's brief. If
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appellant ·s counsel had desired to pursue further questioning on this point, the opportunity was available to
hin1. He did not atte1npt to do so, and is now estopped
fron1 con1plaining that this jurJinan should have been
challenged. Johnson vs. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.
(2d) 134, "~herein the Court. stated, when discussing
a situation similiar to that set up by appellant in the
instant case:
~·Counsel

for the defendant did not attempt
on voir dire to ascertain the existence of such
relationship so that he could -interpose a challenge. Rather, as noted by the trial court 'counsel
is atte1npting to impose a legaL obligation upon
a lay juror to disclose technical sources of
possible preudice. which counsel, himself, failed
to pursue.' ''
.J._t\ppellant, at the trial, was satisfied with his questioning of the jury, and cannot now place the burden
upon the jurymen to disclose every possible experience
in their life ".,.hich may have some degree of similarity
'vith the evidenee which might be later presented to
them.

CONCLUSION
The defendant did not appeal from the part of the
judgment that allowed him $25.00 damages and therefore cannot complain that the jury should have awarded
hiin $50.00 in place of the $25.00.
The case 'vas fully and fairly submitted to the jury.
It is a small case and nothing has been presented to
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establish that the administration of justice should put
these parties to the expense of another trial. Nothing
i~ 1nade to appear that a new trial would reach a different result. The verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff was clearly sustained by the evidence and the judgtnent should therefore be affirmed.

M. C. HARRIS and
C~HARLES

P. OLSON
Attorneys for respondent.
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